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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Consanguinity and Intimate Partner Violence 
by 
Louis Weimer 
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science 
University of California San Diego, 2019 
Professor James Fowler, Chair 
 
 
Why is marriage between relatives common throughout the world? Consanguineous 
marriage was commonplace throughout human history, but became increasingly rare in the 
developed world beginning in the 1800s. For large swaths of the world from Morocco to 
Indonesia, it is still ubiquitous. 
This project investigates the theory that women use consanguineous marriage to mitigate 
their exposure to Intimate Partner Violence. Marrying relatives, particularly first cousins, 
provides women with an ex ante information gathering mechanism and an ex post behavior 
xi 
 
enforcement mechanism, both of which serve to lower the amount of violence to which women 
are exposed. 
Observational data taken from USAID’s Demographic and Health Surveys confirms the 
expected result that consanguinity and Intimate Partner Violence are negatively correlated in 
three of the four countries studied—Pakistan, Egypt, and Jordan. In India, however, the two are 
positively linked. Relying on previous literature, I speculate that the reason behind this 
divergence lies in dowry practices in India. Subsequent chapters investigate the ex-ante 
mechanism in the Indian context and examine the impact of rainfall shocks on both Intimate 
Partner Violence and consanguineous marriage in Jordan, Egypt, and India. 
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Introduction 
In this essay I investigate the theory that women marry first cousins as a means of 
protecting themselves in face of high rates of Domestic Violence. Health surveys conducted in 
Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan offer strong support for this theory—marriage to a first cousin is 
significantly and negatively correlated with Domestic Violence in these countries. In India, 
however, consanguinity and Domestic Violence are significantly and positively correlated. Using 
rainfall as an exogenous shock to examine a theoretically causal chain—rain as a shock to 
domestic violence, then to consanguinity—yields mixed results in both Jordan and Egypt. 
Evidence from India, where first cousin marriage is positively correlated with Domestic 
Violence, suggests that there are important mediating variables the two, most notably dowry. 
The first chapter lays out the theory in greater detail and derives testable hypotheses from 
it. Chapter two presents results from observational tests of the theory using data from USAID’s 
Demographic and Health Surveys in Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and India. Chapter two also 
theorizes as to why results in India diverge so dramatically from those in the other countries. The 
third chapter describes a survey experiment in Mysore, India, that examined how women 
evaluate potential domestic abusers in the marriage market. Chapter four details tests run to 
examine a potential causal chain, with rainfall as a plausibly exogenous shock. I then conclude 
by discussing potential public policy implications, and outlining areas for further research. 
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Chapter One: Theory and Deriving Testable Hypotheses 
Consanguineous marriage—the marriage of genetically close relatives—has been a 
common practice throughout human history. Though the practice now carries a strong stigma in 
the West, it remains popular in other regions of the world, particularly the Middle East, North 
Africa, and Central and South Asia.1 Estimates of the rates of consanguineous marriage vary 
within country and region. At the high end of this spectrum lies Sudan, where more than half of 
all marriages are estimated to be consanguineous. Though few other countries and regions 
approach this level, countries from Morocco to India have rates of consanguineous marriage at 
20 percent or more (Bittles, 2015). Given this geography, it is not surprising that rates of 
consanguineous marriage are consistently highest in countries that are Muslim or Hindu.  
Such high rates of consanguinity are both perplexing and at least mildly concerning, 
considering the wealth of evidence that children of consanguineous couples have a higher risk 
for a variety of genetic disorders, predominantly autosomal recessive (Hamamy, 2011; 
Zlotogora, 2007; Mouzan et al., 2008; Temtamy and Aglan, 2012). Determining the motivation 
behind consanguineous marriage is thus an important practical and academic concern.  
Existing social science literature on consanguineous marriage falls into two broad 
categories, though each are relatively scant. The first is the sociological approach, which focuses 
on the importance of culture and religion in motivating consanguineous marriage (Akrami and 
Osati, 2006; Barbour and Salameh, 2009; Givens and Hirschman, 1994; Hussain, 1999). The 
second is the economic approach, which belongs to a broader literature that examines marriage 
as an institution and the various features of marriage as means of solving institutional 
                                                             
1 Though rates of consanguineous marriage are currently low in the developed world, as late as 1875 the practice 
was common enough that the average genetic closeness of partners was fourth cousins (Kaplanis et al., 2018) 
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commitment problems (e.g., Becker, 1981; Botticini and Siow, 2003; Dnes, 2002; Cigno, 1994). 
While it will also draw from and address public health literature, this project falls squarely into 
the second category. 
The specific commitment problem most germane to this project is that potential husbands 
have no credible means of ex ante guaranteeing that they will not engage in Intimate Partner 
Violence (IPV) once they have married. Many of the countries in which consanguinity is 
common also experience high levels of IPV (Miller, 2002). For instance, about third of women in 
Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and India experience some form of physical abuse by their husband over 
the course of their life (WHO, 2012; Devries et al., 2013). For women living in these societies, 
Intimate Partner Violence is therefore a serious concern. Western-style dating can be seen as a 
means of gathering information about a prospective husband’s abusive tendencies (Arvidsson, 
2006), but in the relative absence of these institutions women must turn to other means or 
insuring against IPV in marriage. There are two common paths women and their families can 
achieve this: ex ante information gathering, and ex post behavior constraint. 
The work of Jacoby and Mansuri (2010) provides an account of how some women use ex 
post behavior constraint examines watta satta marriages, a very specific subset of 
consanguineous marriage common in rural Pakistan. Watta satta is a type of marriage wherein 
families essentially exchange brides: a woman from family A marries into family B, while a 
woman from family B also marries into family A. Jacoby and Mansuri theorize that the threat of 
mutual retaliation prevents grooms and their families from treating wives poorly. If family A 
mistreats the new wife, then family B can mistreat their new wife in the same way. This credible 
mutual threat provides women with an ex post means of constraining abusive behavior. It also 
seems to make women in watta satta marriages better off. The authors show that wives in watta 
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satta marriages experience better marital outcomes, operationalized by a combination of mental 
health and exposure to IPV. 
Though it may provide an excellent ex post behavior constraint, this particular marital 
institution is limited in scope to rural Pakistan. The type of bride exchange is considered to be 
based on dowry and is therefore de facto illegal in many Muslim countries (Bosworth et al., 
1980; Rahim, 2017). So though it is an important work, Jacoby and Mansuri leave open the 
question of how marital institutions might provide a) ex ante information gathering about 
potential abusive tendencies, and b) ex post behavior constraints in countries in which watta 
satta marriages are illegal. 
I argue that consanguineous marriage allows women and their families to address both of 
these problems. It offers women two mechanisms by which they can address problems stemming 
from high rates of Intimate Partner Violence. The first is to gather information about the abusive 
tendencies of potential husbands. It is simply easier and less costly to ascertain whether a man is 
a potential abuser when one already knows him, as is the case for family members. A 
marriageable woman (and her family) will know whether her relative has any violent tendencies 
to a much greater degree than she would for a stranger. Consanguineous marriage is therefore an 
ex ante mechanism for avoiding marriage to potentially violent husbands. I will refer to this as 
the ex ante and ex post mechanism throughout the paper. 
Marrying a close relative also provides another mechanism for women to punish abusive 
behavior during a marriage. Just as it is easier for relatives to gather information about one 
another, it is also easier for relatives to coordinate punishment of other members of their family. 
For instance, a woman who marries an abusive cousin will have more recourse against him 
because she can go to her aunt and uncle (her husband’s parents) if she wants to coordinate an 
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attempt to rein in his abuse. The underlying assumption in this scenario is that this woman has 
established relationships with her aunt and uncle, a relationship that has been shown in other 
contexts to be part of a support system for Intimate Partner Violence (Hadeed and El-Bassel, 
2006; Djikanovic, 2011). A woman approaching her in-laws with whom she has no prior 
relationship is not as likely to elicit a sympathetic response.  Consanguineous marriage thus also 
provides women with an ex post behavior enforcement mechanism by which they can insure 
themselves against domestic abuse. I will refer to this mechanism as the ex post mechanism.2  
This paper therefore contributes to the existing literature on consanguinity on two main 
fronts. First, it posits the existence of the ex ante information gathering mechanism (the ex post 
mechanism is fairly similar to that of Jacoby and Mansuri, though not precisely the same). 
Second, it extends the scope of analysis, at least in principle, to any country in which 
consanguinity is practiced. This is particularly important because watta satta-type arrangements 
are not common in most of these places.  
It is important to note that the level of consanguinity—that is, how closely a potential 
husband and wife pair are related—could play a significant role. We would expect that a woman 
who is a first cousin of a potential husband will know more about his penchant for abuse than she 
would for a second cousin. Likewise, this woman would likely have a stronger preexisting 
relationship with her first cousin’s parents (her aunt and uncle) than she would with her second 
cousin’s parents. The stronger the preexisting relationship, the more a married woman would be 
able to rely on it to constrain her husband’s abusive behavior. We should thus expect that 
                                                             
2 I should note here that this theory is almost entirely deduced from a few principles that I take to be axiomatic. The 
first and most prominent of these is that people derive disutility from physical and emotional harm, which Intimate 
Partner Violence inflicts. From this axiom, I then assume that marriageable women seek a.) information about 
potential husbands that will allow them to infer the likelihood that a potential husband will beat them, and b.) means 
to censure abusive behavior once in marriage  
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marriages between close relatives should also experience less IPV than marriages between more 
distant relatives. The above theory thus applies most obviously to first cousin marriage, which 
will be the focus of this paper. 
Thus far in describing the theory I have assumed that marriageable women are the ones 
who decide whether they will marry individual men. It is of course entirely possible that this is 
not the case. In many cultures (particularly those in which dating is taboo), a woman’s family has 
great influence over her match to a particular man. The same dynamic regarding consanguinity 
and IPV still applies when a woman’s family has a preference for marrying her to a nonabusive 
man. Family members will know more about their relatives’ penchant for violence than they 
would for strangers. Similarly, relatives will be more likely to coordinate punishment for abusive 
men if the recipient of the abuse is also a family member. As long as family members have a 
strong enough preference for their daughters to marry nonabusive men, this theory should still 
apply.  
Admittedly, this theory does have strong limitations, and will only apply in very specific 
scope conditions. The idea that women use consanguineous marriage as a means of gathering 
information about potential husbands only really applies when women can’t gather this 
information in other ways. The simplest way to gather information is to date marriageable men 
before actually entering into marriage. Women will only turn to consanguineous marriage when 
dating is not an option to gather information about marriageable men. We should therefore only 
expect consanguineous marriage and Intimate Partner Violence to be related in places of the 
world where dating is culturally unacceptable. This scope condition effectively removes the need 
for the ex ante mechanism. 
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The second major scope condition in this theory is that women have little formal recourse 
to punish violent spouses. If women could rely on legal authorities and/or police to prevent their 
husbands from engaging in IPV, they would have less reason to worry about screening out 
violent men on the marriage market. They would worry less about establishing ex post 
mechanisms to constrain violent behavior, and would have less need to gather information about 
potential abusers. This theory thus applies best in places in which laws against Intimate Partner 
Violence/Domestic Abuse are either nonexistent or are not effectively enforced.  
These two conditions are of course not met everywhere in the world. Testing the theory 
would require a setting in which a.) dating is not available as a means of gathering information 
about spouses, and b.) There are high rates of Intimate Partner Violence, and little legal recourse 
for women to address it. I will return to this point when describing the site chosen for the survey.  
Dowry and Brideprice: 
In the explication of the theory, closeness between relatives benefits brides in part 
because it allows them to coordinate punishment of abusive behavior. It is conceivable, however, 
that this same closeness might not aid the wife if both her and her husband’s families do not 
value her material safety. In this scenario, closeness of the family might if anything exacerbate 
the violent tendencies of the husband, since it would effectively remove the husband’s parents 
from the wife’s support system. Determining in what contexts the families of husband and wife 
would actually censure the husband’s violent behavior is therefore an important factor for the 
theory to address. 
While there are many characteristics particular to a given couple that could impact 
whether their families support a violent husband or not, there is a societal variable that prior 
literature suggests could be a mediator between consanguinity and IPV—dowry and brideprice. 
 
 
8 
 
A dowry is a payment or series of payments made from the bride’s family to the groom’s around 
the time of marriage. A brideprice is the same, but with payments flowing from the groom’s 
family to that of the bride. Dowries tend to be much larger proportional to income and occur in 
the modern day primarily in South Asia, while brideprice payments are smaller and happen 
mostly in the Middle East and North Africa (Anderson, 2007). In future sections I will analyze 
data from all of Jordan, Egypt, India, and Pakistan. The two Arab countries—Egypt and 
Jordan—practice brideprice, while Pakistan and India practice dowry. I will rely on this 
distinction later to explain differing results from these countries. 
The presence of dowry rather than brideprice could be an important factor shaping the 
relationship between consanguinity and IPV because past research has demonstrated that in some 
contexts dowries are used as a means of extracting wealth from the bride’s family. Rao (2002) 
shows that grooms’ families use the threat of violence against the wife to extract wealth from the 
wife’s family in the form of continued dowry payments. When the bride’s family has provided 
unsatisfactory funds, the groom and his family abuse the bride until her family relents and gives 
additional money or goods. In addition to documenting this phenomenon with surveys and 
interviews, Rao shows that brides who provide smaller initial dowries are more likely to suffer 
IPV later on in marriage.  
Consanguinity could enable this strategic use of IPV in two ways. One, it could help the 
groom’s family monitor the wealth status of the bride’ family, and alert them to potential 
extractive opportunities. Two, it could make the process of wealth extraction easier since the 
groom’s family has greater knowledge of their counterparts’ residence, potential areas of travel, 
etc. The presence of dowry practices in India and Pakistan could therefore conceivably alter the 
relationship between consanguinity and IPV.  
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The practice of dowry could also provide context for whether a husband’s parents will 
support their consanguineously married daughter-in-law. Families who view their daughter-in-
law primarily as a source of wealth will presumably not prioritize her safety, and will even prefer 
for her to be unsafe if the consequence is more money or goods for them. Incorporating this 
dowry vs. brideprice into the theory also addresses the theoretical ambiguity of under what 
circumstances a woman’s parents-in-law will support her.  
The only other piece of economics literature that explicitly incorporates consanguineous 
marriage focuses on the link between consanguinity and dowries. Do, Iyer, and Joshi (2012) 
view consanguineous marriage as a solution to the problem of parents credibly committing to 
support the married couple after their wedding. Their idea is that the bride’s family finds 
supporting the new couple more palatable when the groom is directly related to them. This 
analysis is limited in that it is almost entirely game theoretical, not empirical; that it flatly 
contradicts empirical evidence given by Rao in its formulating assumptions; and that it does not 
consider consanguinity in setting where brideprice is common instead of dowry. I therefore view 
it as having little relevance to this project.  
There is compelling evidence in past literature that dowry and brideprice might be a 
mediating variable in determining the relationship between consanguinity and IPV. For 
simplicity’s sake I will not incorporate this into the subsequent section of hypothesis 
formulation, but I will lean on it to explain why IPV and consanguinity are negatively correlated 
in Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan, but positively so in India.  
Past Public Health Literature: 
I mentioned the two articles in the economics literature that directly address 
consanguinity—Jacoby and Mansuri, 2009; Do, Iyer, and Joshi, 2012—above. The only other 
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discipline that has considered any theoretical link between consanguinity and Intimate Partner 
Violence is public health. As with economics, there are only two articles of which I am aware 
that investigate this relationship at all, and the high-level results from each contradict one 
another.  
The first such study is a cross sectional survey of married Indian women by Aswar N.R 
and coauthors. The authors found that consanguinity was significantly correlated with Intimate 
Partner Violence—that is, that women in consanguineous marriages were comparatively more 
likely to experience Intimate Partner Violence than their counterparts in nonconsanguineous 
marriages (Aswar et al., 2013). The second article was a 2009 study by CJ Clark and coauthors 
that investigated risk factors of Intimate Partner Violence against pregnant women in Jordan. 
They found that consanguinity is significantly and negatively correlated with IPV (Clark et al., 
2009). The prior literature in public health therefore suggests that there could be different 
relationships between consanguinity and IPV in different contexts. 
In neither study was the relationship between consanguinity and IPV the central focus—
each one was primarily concerned with establishing the prevalence of IPV and investigating 
other variables of interest. Consanguinity is simply included as a covariate in the regressions 
each group of authors ran to test their theory, and consequently little attention is paid in either 
case to it (nor should we expect there to be). This project therefore will also contribute to the 
nascent public health literature linking IPV and consanguinity by both confirming the 
superficially contradictory results from these past two studies and by providing a theoretical 
explanation for the underlying relationship between consanguinity and IPV, though more work is 
needed to fully understand the reasons for its heterogeneous nature in different contexts. 
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Hypotheses and Empirical Strategy: 
The overarching theory yields several testable hypotheses, some of which are introduced 
above. The first and most obvious is that cousin marriage should be negatively correlated with 
Intimate Partner Violence in observational data. Let us assume that the ex ante mechanism is 
taking place in the real world, and that women can gather information about their cousins’ 
penchant for marital abuse more efficiently than they can for other men. If this were the case, we 
would expect to see that women who have judged their cousins to be nonviolent would be more 
favorably inclined toward marriage to them, and that therefore there would be more nonviolent 
marriage between cousins than in the general population. In this case, marriage to a cousin 
should be a protective factor (i.e., negatively correlated with) Intimate Partner Violence. 
Similarly, let us assume that the ex post is taking place, and that women who marry their cousins 
have greater recourse to punish abusive behavior than do women who do not marry their cousins. 
In this case we would also expect consanguineous marriage to be a negative correlate of IPV. 
This leads up to the first hypothesis: 
H1: Cousin Marriage is negatively correlated with IPV 
As discussed above, women can marry other relatives besides their first cousins. We 
might also expect the above mechanisms to apply to second cousins and other relatives, though 
to a lesser degree, since we might expect the mechanisms to weaken the more distant the 
marriageable family member is. This leads us to hypotheses H1B and H2C: 
H1B: Marriage to a second cousin is also a negatively correlated with IPV, but not as 
strongly as is marriage to a first cousin 
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H1C: Marriage to another relative is also negatively correlated with IPV, but not as 
strongly as is marriage to a first cousin or marriage to a second cousin 
Now admittedly, the designation of “other relative” can hide quite a bit of variation 
within it. “Other relative” could be an uncle, third cousin, cousins once or twice removed, etc. 
This hidden variation makes testing this hypothesis difficult. I will return to this point when 
discussing the tests for this hypothesis. 
I use USAID’s Demographic Health Survey datasets to test the hypotheses above. 
Surveys conducted in Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan all have modules that investigate both broader 
Domestic Violence (of which Intimate Partner Violence is a subset) and consanguinity. I will 
elaborate on these surveys in chapter three.   
Potential Alternative Explanations: 
The empirical footprint I am looking for in the DHS data is a negative correlation 
between consanguinity and IPV. There would, of course, be other explanations for this finding. 
The two most prominent are what I will call the in-group altruism and the patrilocal exogamy 
theories. The former would view any negative correlation between consanguinity and IPV as 
evidence that members of the same group of people are more generous to one another. This 
argument is not mutually exclusive with the ex post mechanism. Indeed the two might reinforce 
one another; a husband’s in-group “altruism” could be as good as an ex post behavior constraint 
as having a prior relationship with one’s in-laws. For this reason and because of the difficulty is 
disentangling the effects of each, I do not attempt to disprove this argument. 
The second alternative explanation relies on the phenomenon of patrilocal exogamy. This 
explanation builds on research done by Rosenzweig and Stark that documents a strategy Indian 
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families use to insure against extreme drops in income (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989). Their 
research shows that Indian families send their daughters to marry in relatively distant villages to 
spread the risk of negative rainfall shocks (this research has more recently come under question, 
but we will table a more detailed discussion for chapter four).  
In this alternative explanation, a woman’s proximity to her family is a confounding 
variable to consanguinity and IPV. Women who move away from their family due to negative 
income shocks are more likely to experience IPV and less likely to marry consanguineously, thus 
causing a spurious negative correlation between the two. I run tests in chapter four with rainfall 
as a source of exogeneity in part to address this alternative explanation and will return to this 
point at that chapter. 
Survey Work: 
Observational data can support the overarching theory, but survey data designed 
specifically to probe the implications of the theory will go much further in verifying or 
debunking it. To this end, I completed a survey experiment to explore the mechanisms by which 
consanguineous marriage might protect against IPV. In addition to investigating these 
mechanisms, I also use the survey to explore the assumptions undergirding the theory—
specifically, whether consanguineously married women feel more comfortable approaching their 
in-laws for help compared to their counterparts not married to a relative. I will go into greater 
detail on this survey and its experiment and results in chapter three. The assumptions tested there 
are: 
 H2: Women married to their cousins are more comfortable approaching their husband’s
 parents for help constraining his abusive behavior.  
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 H3: Women on the marriage market feel more confident in evaluating the potential
 penchants for violence for their cousins than they do for other men. 
As was the case with Hypothesis 1, we might further expect the same dynamics to apply to 
women married to their second cousins or other relatives, though not to the same degree. 
Accordingly the last assumptions tested are: 
 H2B: Women married to their second cousins are more comfortable approaching their  
 husband’s parents for help constraining his abusive behavior, though not as comfortable 
 as women married to first cousins.  
 H2C: Women married to other relatives are more comfortable approaching their 
 husband’s parents for help constraining his abusive behavior, though not as comfortable 
 as women married to first or second cousins.  
 H3B: Women on the marriage market feel more confident in evaluating the potential 
 penchants for violence for their second cousins than they do for other men, though not as 
 confident as women evaluating their first cousins. 
 H3C: Women on the marriage market feel more confident in evaluating the potential 
 penchants for violence for “other relatives” than they do for other men, though not as 
 confident as women evaluating their first or second cousins. 
I have chosen to list assumptions regarding second cousins and “other relatives” with the 
–B and –C suffixes because I want to emphasize that these are ancillary hypotheses. Tests 
regarding the dynamics of first cousin marriage are the cleanest tests of the overall theory, 
because first cousins are the people to whom the dynamics described in the theory apply most 
strongly and directly. 
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The next three chapters describe different empirical tests of the theory. Chapter two 
examines whether consanguinity is negatively correlated with IPV. Chapter three describes 
survey work done in India to investigate the behavior constraint mechanism. Chapter four 
examines a potential causal chain using rainfall as plausibly exogenous variation of IPV, in turn 
affecting consanguinity. Chaper five then recaps the evidence for the theory, and sketches ideas 
for futures research. I will then conclude by discussing the policy implications of this research 
and what it could mean for societies with high rates of consanguineous marriage if the theory is 
in fact correct. 
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Chapter Two: Correlational Support from Observational Studies 
This chapter uses existing data to investigate the first set of hypotheses. First and 
foremost among these is whether marriage to a cousin is negatively correlated with Intimate 
Partner Violence. The secondary hypotheses are whether the same dynamic applies for women 
married to their second cousins or other relatives, though I also expect these relationships to be 
weaker than the relationship between first cousin marriage and IPV. 
To test these hypotheses, I use USAID’s Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 
datasets. USAID’s Demographic and Health Survey is a program designed to monitor and 
evaluate public health in developing nations. Though these surveys tend to focus on physical 
health and nutrition, different modules are added to country-specific questionnaires to better 
understand public health issues in these countries. Many of these modules focus on women’s and 
children’s issues. Two such modules are the module on domestic violence and the module on 
consanguinity. Consequently, every participant in the domestic violence and consanguinity 
modules is an adult woman.  
The domestic violence module is fairly common, and consists of a battery of questions 
designed to ascertain how frequently respondents experience different types of domestic 
violence, and who perpetrates this violence on them. The consanguinity module is much less 
common, and much shorter. It simply asks respondents whether they are in a consanguineous 
marriage, and what type of relation they had to their husband prior to marriage. 
Of the more than 90 countries in which DHS has sponsored surveys, I am aware of only 
four that contain both domestic violence and consanguinity modules. These are Egypt, Jordan, 
Pakistan, and India. Accordingly, I test hypotheses H1, H1B, and H1C in each of these datasets. 
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Because each survey differs from the others in the presence of certain variables and how these 
variables are coded, and because past public health literature suggests that the link between 
consanguinity and IPV is different in different contexts, I will test these hypotheses country by 
country.  
The DHS surveys I use do not contain any information or data on dowry or brideprice. I 
am consequently unable to use it in regressions to investigate its impact on the relationship 
between consanguinity and IPV. Nonetheless, the presence of dowry in India and Pakistan and 
brideprice in Jordan and Egypt gives some variability in the dowry vs. brideprice variable, if 
only at a very high level. 
Overall, I find strong and consistent evidence in support of H1. In all samples, marriage to 
a first cousin is significantly negatively correlated with certain types of Intimate Partner 
Violence. Support for hypotheses H1B and H1C is more mixed. In some cases, marriage to a 
second cousin or “other relative” is significantly negatively correlated with Intimate Partner 
Violence, and in other cases they are not. I will discuss these mixed findings after describing the 
data and tests in greater detail. 
Before delving into the particularities of each survey, let us first establish the questions 
and variables that are common to each.  
The specific questions posed to survey participants in the domestic violence module are 
consistent country to country. Most relevantly for the present analysis, respondents are asked a 
number of questions regarding the frequency, severity, and type of violence perpetrated by the 
respondent’s husband. Though the DHS does not use this language, these questions clearly 
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represent inquiries specifically into Intimate Partner Violence. A few examples of such questions 
are: 
1.) Have you ever had your arm twisted or hair pulled by your husband or partner? 
2.) Have you ever been physically forced to perform sex by your husband/partner? 
3.) Have you ever been kicked or dragged by your husband/partner? 
There are fourteen such questions in total. The responses are aggregated in the DHS data 
into three binary variables—whether the respondent had ever experienced any less severe 
violence (being pushed, shook, slapped, or hit), more severe violence (kicked, dragged, 
strangled, burnt, or threatened with a weapon), or sexual violence (being forced to perform 
sexual acts). Each of these will serve as the dependent variable is the regressions I run to test the 
theory, and as such are the operationalizations of Intimate Partner Violence used in this essay.  
Operationalization of consanguineous marriage is similarly straightforward. The DHS 
consanguinity modules ask participants whether they were related to their husbands prior to 
marriage, and if so, how they were related. Responses consist of first cousin on father’s and 
mother’s side, second cousin, and “other relationship.” I aggregate respondents married to first 
cousins on their father’s and mother’s sides into one variable corresponding to marriage to a first 
cousin. All other values are treated as is. This is the operationalization of the independent 
variable of interest. 
Many relevant control variables are consistent between datasets. Income and wealth are 
negatively correlated with Intimate Partner Violence in prior literature, though sometimes in an 
inverted-U fashion (Aizer, 2011; Strauss, Gelles, and Steinmetz, 1980). The DHS datasets 
include a wealth measure that is characterized as having five values in each dataset—poorest, 
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poor, middle, richer, and richest. These are coded in the following regressions as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively. Education is also thought to be a potentially significant predictor of IPV, though it 
is unclear to what extent is a mediator for other variables (Jewkes, 2002). Accordingly, I include 
education as a control variable for both husband and wife (education being coded as primary, 
secondary, graduate, and postgraduate).  
Alcohol consumption and drunkenness are perhaps the most consistent and significant 
correlates of Intimate Partner Violence in prior literature (Collins and Metterschmidt, 1993; 
Kantor, 1993; Leonard and Quigley, 1999; O’Leary and Schumacher, 2003). Accordingly, each 
is included as a control. The DHS questionnaire asks respondents if their husband/partner drinks 
alcohol, and if so, how frequently he is drunk. The former is treated as a binary 0/1 variable. The 
potential values for the latter question are Never, Sometimes, and Often, which are coded as 0, 1, 
and 2, respectively.  
Each of the above variables is coded consistently between the four datasets from Jordan, 
Egypt, Pakistan, and India. All are included as controls in the regressions below, along with 
religious information when available. Though the specific religions differ country to country, 
they can be a useful proxy for culture.  
One caveat before presentation of results: all of these regressions are correlational only, 
and employ no identification strategy. They should therefore not be taken as evidence of a causal 
relationship as posited in the explication of the theory. These correlations are consistent with the 
theory, but do not constitute overwhelming evidence for it.   
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Pakistan: 
Less Severe Violence: 
The first test of the theory is to determine whether marriage to a first cousin, and to other 
types of relatives, is negatively correlated with less severe Intimate Partner Violence (being 
pushed, shook, slapped, or hit by their husband/partner).3 As discussed above, the dependent 
variable is coded as a 1 for respondents who have experienced less severe violence and 0 for 
those who have not. Accordingly, I run a logistic regression with the following results: 
                                                             
3 The appendices contain alternative specifications to the models as well as diagnostics for each regression presented 
here. 
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Figure 1 – Pakistan DHS Logistic Regression – Less Severe Violence 
 
 
 
This first test provides support for hypotheses H1 but against hypotheses H1B and H1C. 
Marriage to a first cousin is negatively correlated with the experience of less severe violence, at a 
.01 significance level. This first test thus supports H1. Interestingly and at least somewhat 
confusingly, marriage to a second cousin is in fact positively correlated with less severe violence, 
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though at a .10 significance level. Marriage to an “other relative” is also positively correlated 
with less severe violence, though it does not reach levels of traditional statistical significance. I 
will return to these points in the discussion section for the Pakistani DHS.  
 
More Severe Violence: 
To extend the analysis of Hypotheses 1, 1B, and 1C, I next run essentially the same 
regression as above, but with a different dependent variable. In this case the dependent variable 
is whether a respondent experienced any more severe violence (being kicked, dragged, strangled, 
burnt, or threatened with a weapon).  
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Figure 2 – Pakistan DHS Logistic Regression: More Severe Violence 
 
As the above results show, marriage to a first cousin is again negatively correlated with 
experiencing more severe violence, though this time only at a .05 significance level.  And again 
marriage to a second cousin and “other relative” are both positively correlated with experiencing 
more severe violence, though not at traditional significance levels.  
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Pakistan’s DHS also asked respondents whether they had a say in choosing their husband 
or not. The presence of this variable, which is absent from any other DHS data, enables some 
interesting analysis of whether consanguineously married women are more likely to have had a 
say in choosing their husband. Please see Appendix E for this analysis. 
 
Egypt: 
The next survey I turn to is Egypt’s 2014 DHS. For the most part, I am able to recreate 
the regression run for Pakistan, though with slightly different control variables due to some 
demographic variables not being included in Egypt’s DHS. Some of these controls, such as 
number of children born and a dummy for Christian, are not shown. I do find differing results, 
though: marriage to a first cousin is significantly and negatively associated with more severe 
violence, but not against less severe violence: 
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Figure 3 – Egypt DHS Logistic Regression – Less Severe and More Severe Violence 
 
 
Marriage to a second cousin or “other relative” are once again not significantly related 
with less or more severe violence. That being said, they are insignificantly negatively correlated 
with less severe violence, but insignificantly and positively correlated with more severe violence. 
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Because the significance levels are so low, we cannot say with confidence that there are differing 
dynamics with less severe and more severe violence.  
 
Jordan: 
The next dataset that contains information on both consanguinity and Intimate Partner 
Violence is Jordan’s 2012 DHS. Once again, the questionnaire was very similar to those asked in 
Egypt and Pakistan. I am thus able to run similar regressions here as well, again with controls 
omitted from the table: 
 
 
27 
 
Figure 4 – Jordan  DHS Logistic Regression – Less Severe and More Severe Violence 
 
 
As was the case with Pakistan, marriage to a first cousin is a significant and negative 
covariate of Intimate Partner Violence. However, unlike in Egypt and Pakistan, marriage to a 
 
 
28 
 
second cousin is in fact negatively correlated with Intimate Partner Violence; in the case of less 
severe violence, it is also significantly correlated (at a .01 level).4  
 
Discussion of Results from Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan: 
To recap, for each hypothesis in the results from Jordan, Egypt, and Pakistan: 
H1: Marriage to a first cousin is significantly and negatively correlated in five out of six 
possible regressions (those six possibilities being the Cartesian product of the two levels of 
violence and the three different countries in which the DHS programs took place). The only 
instance above in which marriage to a first cousin was not negatively and significantly correlated 
with Intimate Partner Violence is Egypt’s less severe violence regression. Considering that many 
of these relationships were significant at the .01 level (and sometimes higher), I find strong 
overall support for H1.  
H1B: While I found overall strong support for H1, the evidence for H1B is at best mixed. 
In Pakistan, marriage to a second cousin is in fact a risk factor for Intimate Partner Violence, 
though only significantly so in the case of less severe violence. The relationship between 
marriage to a second cousin and Intimate Partner Violence in Egypt appears to be weak enough 
so as to be at best ambiguous and at worst nonexistent. In Jordan, however, marriage to a second 
cousin is strongly negatively correlated with less severe IPV. Marriage to a second cousin is 
likewise negatively correlated against severe IPV, though not a significant levels. 
                                                             
4 Jordan also has an earlier version of USAID’s DHS dataset that contains information on consanguinity and IPV. I 
do not reference this dataset because of some ambiguities in the coding of the data (consanguinity levels are given in 
both English and transliterated Arabic). Assuming these issues are resolved the way I believe they should be, the 
results from identical regressions are essentially the same 
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What can account for the differences in the direction and significance of the relationship 
between marriage to a second cousin and IPV in these countries, especially in Jordan and 
Pakistan? The theory suggests one possible answer, albeit an entirely speculative one. It is 
possible that family network ties are denser in Jordan than they are in Pakistan, and that this 
density allows women to both better gather information about the abusive tendencies for more 
distant relatives and to coordinate punishment against their husbands in the case of abuse. The 
density of family ties and networks could thus be an important control variable to account for in 
future work.  
H1C: Overall support for H1C is weak, bordering on nonexistent. The relationship 
between marriage to “other” relatives and Intimate Partner Violence, whether more or less 
severe, is all over the map in the regressions I ran. The only consistency is that the relationship 
was not significant in any of the above tests.  
Of course, it is possible if not likely that the lack of finding here comes from a poor 
agglomeration of the data that hides more than it reveals. The designation of “other relative” 
could contain uncles, third cousins, cousins once or twice removed, and potentially other 
relatives as well. The dynamics of the theory I have outlined could apply differently to each of 
these disparate relations. It should therefore not be surprising that including all of them under 
one categorization would lead to inconsistent and insignificant results. Disaggregating this 
variable is another avenue for future work to take (and I attempt to do so in a small way during 
the survey in India). 
The mixed (at best) results for hypotheses H1B and H1C do not qualify as evidence against 
the general theory. Both mechanisms, ex ante and ex post, apply most strongly to women who 
marry their first cousins. The theory is ambivalent about more distant relatives. Tests in this 
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section suggest that the relationship between marriage to a second cousin or other type of relative 
and Intimate Partner Violence are not as straightforward as is the relationship between marriage 
to a first cousin and IPV.  
 
India: 
The results presented thus far from surveys conducted in Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan 
predominantly corroborate the primary hypothesis that consanguinity (especially marriage 
between first cousins) in these contexts is negatively correlated with IPV. This point is further 
elaborated on this point in subsequent sections, but results are first presented of similar 
regressions using from India’s 2015/16 Demographic and Health Survey. These results are 
diverge from those from Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan. In all operationalizations and 
specifications, marriage to a blood relative is a significant risk factor for Intimate Partner 
Violence. Below are regressions mirroring those from the previous three countries: 
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Figure 5 – India DHS Logistic Regression – Less Severe and More Severe Violence 
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Why India?: 
The next question is of course why the results from these regressions are so different. 
What accounts for the fact that the relationship between first cousin marriage and IPV is negative 
in Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan, but positive in India? The explanation most consistent with the 
theory is that the relationship between consanguinity and IPV is determined in part by the 
presence of dowries.  
To understand why, let us reexamine Rao, 2002—“Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: a 
Case Study of Violence in Rural India”. Rao finds that the groom’s family uses the practice of 
dowry and the threat of violence against the wife as a means of extracting money from the 
bride’s family. It is certainly conceivable that marriages between first cousins would enable this 
sort of threat, since the groom’s family has much greater knowledge of and access to the family 
of the bride. The preexisting ties between families that I theorized could help women censure 
abuse in contexts without dowries thus might actually exacerbate this abuse in cases with dowry. 
This explanation is consistent with consanguinity’s negative correlation with IPV in 
Egypt and Jordan, since dowries are not widely practiced in either country. Instead, both 
countries for the most part practice brideprice, rather than dowry (Anderson, 2007). That is, 
marriage practices in these places are characterized by transfers from the groom’s family to that 
of the bride. There is therefore less opportunity for grooms and their families to coerce transfers 
from the bride’s family than there would be in India. The presence of brideprice rather than 
dowry might therefore be a necessary condition for the mechanisms I theorized to occur. 
There are three notable complications to this explanation. First, it is not clear to what 
extent wealth extraction from the family of a first cousin would actually be productive, since 
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wealth could be shared through families without this mechanism. Second, it makes the 
relationship between IPV and consanguinity in Pakistan puzzling, since dowry practices there 
mirror those in India far more than those in Egypt and Jordan (Anderson, 2007). We would 
therefore expect consanguinity to be positively correlated with IPV in Pakistan, but of course it is 
not. The only explanation I have for this is to reference the strong correlation between 
consanguineous coupling and watta satta marriages. It is possible that the effect of bride 
exchange is masking the effect of dowry on IPV. Third, it is not clear why opportunistic families 
in Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan could abuse a wife to extract payments from her family and 
simply call these payments something other than dowry.  
Elaborating on this third point, it is possible that the presence of brideprice or dowry as 
institutions might reflect underlying power (im)balances between men and women. That families 
in India use IPV to extract wealth but not those in Egypt, Jordan, or Pakistan is more due to this 
nebulous but still real value that women have in each respective society than dowry or brideprice 
as institutions. There are two reasons to give credence to the power of dowry as an institution in 
affecting the relationship between consanguinity and IPV. The first is that much prior literature 
on the determinants of dowry and brideprice has found societal complexity and class 
stratification to be more important than the relative power between genders (Hughes, 1985; 
Quale, 1988; Ebrey, 1993). This suggests that this power balance affects development of dowry 
vs. brideprice less than we might intuitively expect. Second, dowry practices exploded in 
popularity in India around its independence from Britain, during a time when women were 
gaining more access to education and political rights (Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell, 1983; 
Billig, 1992). This suggests that dowry as an institution might even grow stronger despite 
women’s increased “power” or “value” in society. Both of these points show that dowry does not 
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in fact correspond neatly to any particular set of power relationship between genders, which in 
turn casts doubt on it as a confounding variable. 
Incorporating dowry and brideprice into the theory gives an explanation for the results in 
India, but it also turns the results in Pakistan into a theoretical outlier. Dowry and marriage 
practices in India, or at least the north part of the country, are fairly similar to those in Pakistan 
(Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001). If this is the case, we might expect the relationship between 
consanguinity and IPV in Pakistan to mirror that in India. But of course it does not. Perhaps the 
watta-satta style marriage has a stronger effect than dowry practices on IPV. These answers are 
speculative, and require further research. 
These conjectures regarding the role of dowries in the link between IPV and 
consanguinity cannot be tested using the DHS data, which does not contain information on 
dowries or brideprice. An important area for future research is thus to explore this role, a point 
discussed further in later sections.  
 
Conclusion: 
Consistent results across different types of IPV within Muslim countries, coupled with 
the results demonstrating that the ability to have a say in choosing one’s husband is significantly 
and positively correlated with marriage to a first cousin, offers strong albeit qualified support for 
H1. In addition to its relevance to the theory, this result is an important contribution to theories of 
consanguineous marriage and its decline in developed nations.  
Initial research in this area theorized that consanguinity decreased as a byproduct of 
modernization, but high rates of consanguinity have persisted and even grown in the face of 
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modernizing factors such as industrialization and better access to education (Hamamy, 2012; 
Tadmouri et al., 2009). Other research has emphasized the roles of increasing mobility 
(Maleicot, 1969) or shifting cultural attitudes regarding consanguinity (Cavalli-Sforza, et al., 
2004) in the decline of consanguineous marriage. The results here suggest another alternative (or 
offer more specifics on the role cultural attitudes have in the decline). Consanguineous marriage 
might have declined as a result of women gaining more legal recourse to address problems of 
Intimate Partner Violence. Exploring this hypothesis in the contexts of previously cited research 
in Europe and North America is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is at least an interesting 
route for future research.  
The empirical evidence presented above is consistent with the theoretical logic discussed 
in Chapter 1, at least in the case of the three majority Muslim countries. As mentioned earlier, 
correlational analysis of observational data can only accomplish so much in terms of confirming 
the theory. There are several alternative explanations for these findings. Additionally, the 
specific mechanism at play is ambiguous, even in theory—the results presented in this chapter 
are consistent with both the ex post and ex ante mechanisms. The next chapter of this essay is 
therefore devoted to exploring how marriage to a first cousin might affect Intimate Partner 
Violence by employing a novel survey of women affected by it in Mysore, India.  
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Chapter Three: Survey Experiment in Mysore, India 
This chapter describes a custom survey I conducted in partnership with a local Indian 
NGO to explore the ex post mechanism. We designed and ran this survey prior to the release of 
the Indian DHS data analyzed in the previous chapter, and therefore did not know that 
consanguineous marriage is positively correlated to IPV in India. Likewise, the survey was 
written prior to the consideration of dowry/brideprice as an important mediating variable. 
Consequently, important variables to the overall theory are not fully explored in this chapter. 
Despite these limitations, there are interesting results from the survey and survey experiment that 
provide avenues for further research. Indeed, exploring the relationship between consanguinity 
and IPV in a country where the two are positively correlated can help demonstrate the strength 
and weakness of the theory. 
To test the theory that women turn to consanguineous marriage in the face of high rates 
of Intimate Partner Violence, I partnered with a local NGO, the Public Health Research Institute 
of India, to run a survey and survey experiment in the city of Mysore. The PHRII is a healthcare 
nonprofit that works to increase knowledge of and access to different healthcare options in 
Mysore and its surrounding areas.  
Mysore is a city of about a million people in the province of Karnataka, in southwest 
India. Rates of consanguinity and intimate partner violence are both relatively high in Mysore. 
Additionally, Mysore is a fairly culturally conservative city (typical of southern India), in which 
western style dating practices are uncommon. The conditions under which the theory would 
hold—high rates of intimate partner violence and an inability for women to gather information 
about potential husbands on the marriage market—are thus present in Mysore. It is therefore a 
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good setting for work investigating the relationship between consanguineous marriage and 
Intimate Partner Violence.  
Married women in and around Mysore who attended health clinics at the PHRII were 
asked to participate in this survey. 303 agreed to do so. PHRII workers administered the survey 
in Kannada, the local language, and recorded their responses.  
Survey and Experiment: 
We test the theory in the survey in three ways. To begin with, we collected a wide swath 
of demographic information—age, income, education, etc.—along with information on the level 
of consanguinity of the marriage and the frequency and type of Intimate Partner Violence. To 
measure consanguinity, we asked respondents if prior to marriage their husband was their first 
cousin, second cousin, uncle, other relative, or not a direct relation. Below are summary statistics 
on this variable: 
Figure 6 –  Mysore, India – Consanguinuity Compared to IPV 
 
We also measured different types of Intimate Partner Violence. Following from the 
World Health Organization (WHO, 2005), we asked questions regarding whether participants’ 
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husbands had ever slapped her, hit her, forced her to perform sexual acts without her consent, 
and threatened to or actually used weapons against her.  
I then use this information to replicate, to the greatest extent possible, the regressions run 
in the previous chapter. Once again, the data in this survey do not match the theoretical 
expectation that consanguinity and Intimate Partner Violence are negatively correlated. In 
logistic regressions that replicate those in the previous chapter, marriage to a first cousin, second 
cousin, uncle, and “other relative” were not significantly correlated with Intimate Partner 
Violence, however defined. However, these regressions suggest that marriage to a first and 
second cousin are both consistently negatively correlated with the different types of IPV, but not 
at significant levels.  
This insignificance may be partially explained by statistical power, or lack thereof. These 
other regressions on DHS data each had more than 10 times the sample size of the ones run from 
the survey data, so it should not be surprising that the lower-powered regressions did not find 
significant relationships between the different levels of consanguineous marriage and IPV.  
The next step we took to test the theory was to ask participants about their comfort level 
in approaching their parents-in-law for help constraining on type of abusive behavior—hitting—
on the part of their husband. As a follow up, we also asked participants whether they had in the 
past ever actually gone to their parents-in-law for their help in stopping their husbands from 
hitting them. The specific wording of these questions (in English) is as follows: 
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1.) If you ever felt your husband had hit or hurt you without good reason, how 
 comfortable would you be approaching your husbands parents to ask them to stop him 
 from hurting you? (Responses for this question are on a 1-5 Likert Scale, with 1 being 
 very uncomfortable and 5 being very comfortable) 
2.) Have you ever asked your husbands parents to intervene with him to stop hitting 
 you? 
These questions comprise the most straightforward test of the theory. The expectation is 
that women in consanguineous marriages feel more comfortable approaching their in-laws for 
help, and to also be more likely to have actually done so. Again, this relationship should extend 
but also attenuate for women married to second cousins and other relatives. The theory is 
ambiguous as to what to expect from women married to their uncles: 
H4: Women in consanguineous marriages should feel more comfortable approaching their
 parents-in-law for help constraining their husband than women married to nonrelatives  
H4A: Women married to their first cousins should feel more comfortable approaching
 their parents-in-law for help constraining their husband than women married to
 nonrelatives and more distant relatives 
H4B: Women married to their second cousins should feel more comfortable approaching
 their parents-in-law for help constraining their husband than women married to
 nonrelatives, but still should feel less comfortable doing so than women married to their
 first cousins 
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The results from the data are in line with theoretical expectations in some respects, but 
not in others. Below is a table detailing an ordered logistic regression to test whether being in a 
consanguineous marriage of any kind is significantly predictive of being comfortable 
approaching your in-laws for help with their husband5: 
 
Figure 7 – Logistic Regression – Any Consanguinity and Comfort Approaching In-Laws 
 
As shown, being in a consanguineous marriage is positively and significantly correlated 
with being comfortable approaching parents-in-law for help, corroborating H4. However, these 
                                                             
5 I recognize that running logistic regressions here isn’t strictly speaking a true test of Hypotheses H4A and H4B, 
since they don’t directly compare marriages to first cousins, second cousins, and other relatives. Nonetheless, this 
seems to be the best approach to testing the theory 
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results diverge with theoretical expectations when we replace the consanguinity dummy variable 
with variables identifying which type of consanguineous marriage a respondent was in: 
Figure 8 – Logistic Regression – Specific Relationship  and  Comfort Approaching In-Laws 
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Marriage to a first cousin essentially has no relationship with being comfortable 
approaching your in-laws. Every other type of consanguineous marriage is positively and 
significantly associated with this variable, however. This implies that the significance in the 
previous regression came about despite the relationship between first cousin marriage and 
approaching one’s in-laws, not because of it. I interpret these results to be mild evidence for H4, 
and no evidence for H4A, and qualified evidence for H4B (since marriage to a second cousin has a 
stronger relationship with the variable of interest than does marriage to a first cousin). 
The next test of the theory was to ask participants if they had actually ever approached 
their husband’s parents to ask them to intervene with him to prevent him from hitting them. In 
theory, women who are married to their first cousins should feel more comfortable approaching 
their parents-in-law for help constraining their husbands’ abusive behavior than do women who 
are married to non-relatives. This relationship should also extend to second cousins, who 
themselves should still be less comfortable than first cousins doing so: 
H5: Women in consanguineous marriages should have approached their parents-in-law
 for help constraining their husband more than women married to nonrelatives  
H5A: Women married to their first cousins should have approached their parents-in-law
 for help constraining their husband more than women married to nonrelatives and more
 distant relatives 
H5B: Women married to their second cousins should have approached their parents-in
 law for help constraining their husband more than women married to nonrelatives, but
 should still should have done so less than women married to their first cousins 
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This question did not apply to the respondents whose husbands had never hit them, so the 
total sample is smaller than in the previous question. As with the previous set of regressions, I 
first examine women in any kind of consanguineous marriage, then substitute in dummies for 
each particular type of it: 
Figure 9 – Logistic Regression – Any Consanguinity and to Asked  In-Laws for Help 
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Figure 10 – Logistic Regression – Specific Relationship and Asked In-Laws for Help 
 
Once again, consanguinity is significantly and positively associated with having actually 
asked in-laws for help. However, this relationship appears to be primarily driven by the strength 
of the correlation between being in a second cousin marriage and having actually gone to in-laws 
for advice. This means that the theory seems to apply to second cousins more so than first 
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cousins, unlike in the DHS samples. This is a contradictory result I will return to in the 
discussion. 
The last test of the theory was a survey experiment. Participants were asked to imagine a 
scenario in which they evaluated hypothetical men as prospective husbands for a hypothetical 
friend. The experimentally manipulated variable was the description of these hypothetical men. 
About one quarter of participants received a description of a man who was a cousin of their 
friend and who also displayed violent tendencies, such as drinking and fighting. Another quarter 
of participants received a description of a man who was also a cousin of their friend but who 
displayed no violent tendencies. One more quarter of participants received a description of a man 
who was not related to their friend but who displayed violent tendencies. The final quarter 
received a description of a man who was unrelated to their friend and who displayed no violent 
tendencies. Thus we manipulated two experimental factors in this description: whether the 
hypothetical man was related to respondents’ hypothetical friend, and this hypothetical man’s 
penchant for violence.  
After receiving these descriptions, respondents were asked whether they felt that the 
hypothetical man would engage in IPV after marriage to their hypothetical friend. We also asked 
them to explain why they thought he would or wouldn’t do so in a free form response. In theory, 
women who marry consanguineously would be confident that they would be able to use their 
familial connections as a constraint on potential abusive behavior on the part of their husband. 
We would therefore expect participants who received a description of a consanguineous man 
who displayed violent tendencies to think that he would be less abusive than participants who 
received a description of a violent man but one who was unrelated to his wife.  
 
 
46 
 
The results of this survey experiment were inconclusive. There was a significant 
difference between all four experimental groups in whether respondents felt that the hypothetical 
man in question would engage in IPV. There was no difference, however, between respondents 
who received a description of a violent and related man and those who received descriptions of a 
violent and unrelated man.  
How do we reconcile this finding with the earlier result that participants in 
consanguineous marriages were more comfortable approaching their in-laws for help 
constraining unjustified abusive behavior? Given the abstract nature of the question, and that it 
came at the end of a fairly lengthy survey, it is entirely possible that survey fatigue had set in 
with respondents by the time they were asked the survey experiment questions. If this is the case, 
we might discount the results from the survey experiment.  
If this is not the case, however, it is entirely possible that women in consanguineous 
marriages are more likely to approach their husbands’ parents for help constraining their 
husbands’ abusive behavior but that they don’t factor this into decisions regarding marriage. 
Future work in this area should explore this possibility, perhaps qualitatively by conducting 
interviews with marriageable women. 
Although there were no statistically significant differences between groups that received 
descriptions of a related man and an unrelated man, about a third of respondents mentioned the 
relationship between the wife and her parents-in-law explicitly when discussing the reasoning 
behind their answer.6 About 40 percent of these thought that the parents would support their 
                                                             
6 Appendix A contains code and output from R’s structural topic modelling package that attempted to glean what 
covariates were most associated with the topic of parental support for son and daughter-in-law. I don’t include these 
results in the main text because I don’t believe that structural topic modelling does enough to demarcate women who 
believe a consanguineously married woman would have the support of her in-laws in domestic abuse case from 
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daughter-in-law, but the remaining 60 thought that the parents would support their son. For 
illustration, below are a few of the quotes from each position (all quotes below came from 
respondents in the consanguineous treatment group): 
“His parents know about their son’s behaviour so they will support their daughter-in-
 law.” 
“His parents will not consent to him hitting their daughter-in-law.” 
“In the case that the husband beats the wife, the parents will always support the man.” 
“My sister-in-law married a relative and he was violent to her, but his parents supported
 him and told him he was doing right by her”. 
Investigating why some respondents believe the hypothetical parents would support their 
son vs. their daughter-in-law is therefore an important extension of this analysis. Inferring 
semantic meaning from free form responses is difficult, especially when the unordered bag-of-
words usually contain the same words. To that end, I manually coded instances where the 
respondent thought the parents would support the daughter-in-law and when they would support 
their son. I then ran two separate regressions with support for son/daughter-in-law as dependent 
variables and various controls as the right hand side variables. These regressions yield null 
results (unsurprisingly, given the small sample size). So despite that lack of statistical 
significance, this chapter does at least develop a new and interesting question—the differential 
expectations of respondents with regard to whom the husband’s parents support in a 
consanguineous marriage. 
                                                             
those who believe her husband would have their support. As the output shows, word frequency doesn’t help in 
making this distinction. 
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An interesting adaptation of this question to consider implementing in the next survey is 
to collect free form responses in Arabic. Because Arabic has a case system (albeit a light one), 
syntax is less important and semantic meaning might be able to be inferred from free-form 
responses with structural topic modelling (for an example of how text mining works with Arabic, 
see Alrefei et al., 2018). This is another motivation to conduct the follow up survey in either 
Jordan or Egypt, though the survey text provided to the researcher would need to include 
diacritic marks. 
 
Discussion: 
Some of the results from this chapter are difficult to square with those from the chapter 
analyzing the DHS in India, while others are perfectly in line with them. One the one hand, given 
that consanguineous marriage of all forms seems to be positively correlated with IPV in India, it 
is not surprising that women married to their first cousin and other relatives should not seek help 
from their in-laws in constraining abusive behavior. But then why do women married to their 
second cousins seek their in-laws’ help far more frequently?  
As discussed in previous chapters, past research (Rao 2002 and Aswar et al. 2013) 
suggests that marriage to a first cousin in India encourages IPV because grooms’ families use 
dowries and the threat of violence to extract wealth from the bride and her family. I posited that 
marriage to a first cousin might exacerbate this violence, but it is possible this relationship does 
not generalize to second cousins and other relatives. Even if this were the case, however, it 
would be inconsistent with the results from the previous chapter that show that consanguinity in 
all its forms is positively correlated with IPV. 
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To what extent can we count the results from this survey as support for the ex post 
mechanism? In the context of the results from India’s DHS, only in a very limited sense. I was 
testing for the existence of the ex post as an explanation for the relationship between 
consanguinity and IPV prior to incorporating, but that relationship seems to work in the exact 
opposite way from theoretical assumptions. I therefore don’t believe that any experiment in India 
can tell us about the dynamics governing IPV and consanguinity in Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan.  
Consequently, a natural next step for this research agenda to redo this survey, or some 
version of it, in either Jordan, Egypt, or Pakistan. For practical reasons and because Arabic is a 
better language for semantic inference, the best country to run a follow up survey in would likely 
be Jordan. An ideal experiment would be run a similar survey experiment to the one just 
described, but on a population of marriageable women. This would better examine the dynamics 
governing consanguinity and IPV for people who are making the decision to marry. Although 
this survey focuses on examining the ex post mechanism, because it took place in India I think it 
would be worthwhile to continue to focus on this ex post behavior enforcement mechanism, 
since evidence suggests that it supersedes the ex ante information gathering mechanism.  
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Chapter Four: Examining the Causal Chain Using Rainfall 
The previous chapter investigated the theory using observational and novel survey data. 
The weakness of this approach is that there are alternative explanations for the correlations 
derived in those regressions. The next step would ideally be to build an identification strategy by 
using some form of exogenous variation in domestic abuse and assess the response of first cousin 
marriages. Data and time constraints prevent me from doing so, but it is not difficult to imagine a 
strategy building upon prior microeconometric work to examine the impact of plausibly 
exogenous increases in domestic violence enforcement on first cousin marriage. One strategy 
that build upon past work might exploit differences in women’s representation between federal 
states in the same country, as in Duflo and Chattopadhyay, 2004. Another, simpler strategy could 
examine the differential rollout of anti-domestic abuse laws, as in Beleche, 2017. This latter 
strategy would be predicated upon these laws actually being effective; many domestic abuse 
laws on the books in Middle Eastern and South Asian countries are essentially unenforced. 
In lieu of a true identification strategy along those lines, I follow Miguel (2005) in 
building two different sets of regressions with rainfall as an explanatory variable. Miguel’s 
article is interested in examining the impact poverty has on witch killing, and uses negative 
rainfall as an exogenous shock to the former. Data issues prevent Miguel from using an 
instrumental variable approach, so instead he uses rainfall shocks as an independent variable in 
two regressions; first with income as the response, then with number of witch killings. In this 
way he builds the argument that poverty directly impacts with killing. 
I replicate this reduced-form strategy in estimating the impact domestic abuse has on first 
cousin marriage. Prior literature that finds that poverty is correlated with IPV in other contexts 
(Modie-Moroka, 2010; Slabbert, 2016) and that poverty might even cause IPV in both the 
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developing (Cools and Kotsadam, 2017) and developed world (Schneider et al., 2016). Some 
prior literature even uses rainfall shocks to establish this causality (Sekri and Storeygard, 
2014).The arguments explaining this association emphasize the strategic use of IPV; they claim 
men whose income has decreased use IPV to reestablish control and power in their relationship. I 
posit that women might be aware of their increased risk of IPV during climate shocks and choose 
to marry their first cousins more frequently as a means of insuring against this outcome. 
Consequently, I follow Miguel in building two separate regressions. Rainfall variation is the 
independent variable of interest in each, while IPV is the dependent variable in the first, and first 
cousin marriage is the dependent variable in the second.  
At this point I need to emphasize that this is approach is not intended to be a true 
instrumental variable, but rather a means of examining links in the causal chain. I am testing two 
hypotheses separately. First, that rainfall shocks are positively correlated to IPV. And second, 
that these shocks are also positively correlated to first cousin marriage.  
 
Data and Population Selection: 
The data I used to provide information on historical rainfall is the Climate Hazards Group 
InfraRed Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS). This data contains yearly information on the 
amount of rainfall at each recording station, of which there are hundreds of thousands. The years 
recorded in this dataset go all the way back to 1981, so it is a rich repository of information 
regarding rainfall data. The dataset itself is organized by yearly rainfall values paired with 
unique longitude-latitude points corresponding to the location of the station that collected the 
data.   
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Three of the DHS datasets I analyzed in the previous chapters contain similar information 
on longitude-latitude location of the respondent—Egypt, Jordan, and India. I merge CHIRPS 
historical rainfall data to these datasets based on longitude-latitude pairings, so that each DHS 
respondent is paired to the closest station. 
A note about these merges: the longitude-latitude location of each DHS respondent is 
actually displaced randomly up to five miles away from its true location for purposes of 
anonymity. Likewise, only about half of the listed locations of DHS correspondents lived within 
1 mile of a CHIRPS station, but many more lived within two miles of one. Both of these 
complications likely introduce noise to any measure of rainfall, but Tobler’s First Law suggests 
that this noise is likely not substantial (Tobler, 1970).  
Testing the first hypothesis—that rainfall shocks are positively correlated with IPV—is 
fairly straightforward, since IPV varies with time and we have recent observations on it. To see 
whether IPV is correlated with rainfall shocks, we can simply regress IPV as reported in the 
DHS on rainfall deviation, however operationalized. This will tell us whether rainfall shocks 
during one year are positively correlated with IPV in the same or subsequent year.  
H6: Extreme Rainfall shocks the full year prior to a DHS are positively correlated with 
 IPV in subsequent years 
Testing the next hypothesis—that rainfall shocks are correlated with first cousin 
marriage—is more challenging for a number of reasons. The first is that marriage does not 
significantly vary with time. Once a person is married, they tend to stay married for long periods 
of time, especially in societies in which divorce is less common. Measuring marriage as a time-
varying covariate is therefore more difficult than IPV. The second, more serious problem is that 
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these DHS datasets do not contain information on respondents’ precise year of marriage. They 
do have information on the year of first cohabitation with husband, which likely corresponds 
fairly well to year of marriage. I use this latter variable as a stand in for date of marriage. 
Even assuming that cohabitation corresponds well to marriage, there is a problem in 
terms of timeframe consistency with these regressions. In the rainfall and IPV tests, all 
observations occur during the year of the survey, while including all observations from the DHS 
in rainfall and consanguinity tests would mean that I would be examining the correlation of 
rainfall with past observations. For these reasons, for the rainfall and first cousin marriage tests I 
subset the DHS datasets to include only respondents who have first cohabitated within the past 
full year of the time of the survey. Because the original hypotheses regarding more distant 
relations were ancillary, I do not focus on including these as dependent variables in this section. 
H7: Extreme Rainfall shocks the full year prior to a DHS are positively correlated with
 marriage to a first cousin in subsequent years 
 
Extreme Rainfall Operationalization: 
As a final note before presenting the regressions, it’s worth describing the precise 
operationalization of rainfall shocks. For each dataset, I calculate the mean and standard 
deviation of rainfall prior to the last full year prior to the date of the interview. (For example, the 
2014 Egypt DHS was conducted in March-April of 2014, so 2013 would be the last full year 
prior to the survey). I then subtract that mean from the value of rainfall in the last full year prior 
to the survey, then divide by the standard deviation calculated in the previous step. This gives the 
number of standard deviations away from the mean the most recent year’s rainfall was.  
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I use the absolute value of this variable as one operationalization of rainfall deviation. 
The idea is that extreme rainfall in either direction—up or down—is bad for income because 
flood is every bit as impactful as drought. The number of standard deviations away from the 
mean is therefore a continuous measurement of the extremity of a rainfall shock.  
Though this continuity is appealing as a measure, it does come with a drawback. To 
understand why, consider the range of possible values that the number of standard deviations 
away from the mean yearly rainfall can take. Any value below mean rainfall would be bad for 
income, as would many values above the mean, since flood is just as bad as drought. But there is 
a slight area above the mean in which rainfall would actually be beneficial, since there would be 
more water for plants, but not enough to drown them.  
Below is an abstract representation of this dynamic for a zero-centered distribution. The 
brown area represents the narrow band for which increased rainfall would be beneficial; all other 
values of the rainfall distribution would be harmful. I am agnostic as to the specific value of the 
upper bound of this range, but pick .25 for illustrative purposes: 
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Graph 1 – Increased Rainfall can be Beneficial in Small Amounts 
 
 
There is therefore a range of values of standard deviations away from mean rainfall for 
which taking the absolute value would mask the effects of rain. A two standard deviation 
distance away from the mean is bad for income regardless of which direction this distance takes; 
but .1 standard deviations away from the mean can be good or bad, depending on the direction. 
This is the downside of this operationalization of extreme rainfall. 
Jordan offers a better context to use this operationalization of rainfall shock because it 
experienced a countrywide drought in the time period used to calculate the absolute rainfall 
deviation variable. This means that there are no values above the mean rainfall that might 
complicate the interpretation of the variable, and that in the context of Jordan all standard 
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deviations away from the mean are negative. Below is a histogram detailing the distribution of 
the number of standard deviations from the mean that respondents in the Jordan DHS 
experienced the last full year prior to the survey: 
Graph 2 – Jordan's Drought, No Floods 
 
 
This contrasts with Egypt, where respondents experienced both positive and negative 
deviations from historical rainfall: 
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Graph 3  – Egypt's Droughts and Floods 
 
Because of this countrywide drought, Jordan has none of the complications with regard to 
the absolute value of rainfall standard deviations that Egypt and India do. For this reason, I 
believe that Jordan’s DHS offers the best data in which to test these hypotheses. I will return to 
this point when discussing regression results. 
Standard deviations from the mean is the first measure of extreme rainfall. Following 
prior literature, the other operationalization I use is simply a dummy variable for whether rainfall 
was more than one standard deviation away from the mean in either direction (Hossain and 
Ahsan, 2018; Iyer and Topalova, 2014; Cole 2012, etc.). This is an arbitrary measure in the sense 
that it is not clear why one standard deviation is the cutoff for significance instead of .5, 1.25, or 
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any other number. Nonetheless, other literature incorporating rainfall shocks uses this as a 
measure, so I will as well. 
 
Rainfall and Intimate Partner Violence: 
For regressions with IPV as the dependent variable, I subset the data to include only rural 
observations (as defined by the DHS data). I do so because rural residents are far more likely to 
be affected by rainfall shocks than their urban counterparts are. The income shocks that rainfall 
deviation represents are more likely to strongly affect rural residents, who therefore present a 
better chance to test the theory. 
I replicate the regressions in chapter 2, but replace consanguinity with rainfall as the 
independent variable of interest. As was the case in chapter 2, dependent variables are the 
different operationalizations of Intimate Partner Violence. Below are regressions from Egypt and 
Jordan, with standard errors clustered on latitude-longitude location of the CHIRPS station 
matched to each respondent (Esarey and Menger, 2017): 
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Figure 11 – Extreme Rainfall and IPV in Jordan 
 
In line with theoretical expectations, rainfall does appear to be significantly and 
positively correlated with IPV in Jordan. Absolute Rainfall Deviation is positively related with 
both types of IPV, one at traditional significance (severe violence), and one just missing it (less 
severe violence). The dummy for extreme rainfall is positively and significantly correlated to 
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both operationalizations of IPV. These results in Jordan therefore conform to the theory that 
rainfall shocks should be positively correlated with IPV. 
Below are the same regressions in Egypt: 
Figure 12 – Egypt Rainfall IPV 
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Counter to expectations, extreme rain is significantly and negatively correlated with 
severe violence in Egypt. Consistent with expectations, though, the absolute deviation from 
mean rainfall is positively correlated with less severe violence and almost at traditional 
significance levels. Other operationalizations of rainfall and IPV are not related.  
One explanation for these results stems from the fact that not many observations fell 
more than one standard deviation away from the mean rainfall, and those that did tended to fall 
quite some distance away. It might be possible that in the rural Egyptian context, such truly 
extreme swings in rainfall cause families to rely more on contributions from women, which 
increases their bargaining power and decreases the amount of IPV they endure. Past research has 
demonstrated this of inverted U relationship between wealth and IPV in the United States 
(Strauss, Gelles, and Steinmetz, 1980). No research of which I am aware has demonstrated this 
relationship in the Egyptian context, and in the DHS data the probability of experiencing any 
form of IPV monotonically decreases with increases in wealth. This explanation is therefore 
speculative and much additional work would need to be done to verify it.  
 
Rainfall and IPV in India: 
As the previous chapter hopefully demonstrated, it is not entirely clear that we should 
expect the same results from India that we do from Egypt and Jordan. The evidence from prior 
chapters suggest that dynamics governing consanguinity, IPV, and other related variables are 
fundamentally different in India than in Egypt and Jordan. One would think that the causal chain 
inspected in Egypt and Jordan wouldn’t apply in India, since consanguinity is positively linked 
with IPV there. 
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Nonetheless, whether rainfall and IPV/consanguinity are correlated in the Indian context 
merits investigation. I therefore repeat the same regressions with the India DHS, with only 
variables of interest shown for brevity. As was the case with previous regressions, I include only 
rural observations. That the number of observations remains so high is evidence for how much 
more rural the residences of respondents in India were: 
Figure 13 – Extreme Rainfall and IPV in India 
 
 
Similar to Egypt, rainfall is significantly related to IPV both positively and negatively—
positive in the case of severe violence, and negative in the case of less severe. One explanation, 
albeit speculative, for this hearkens back to the explanation proffered for India’s anomalous 
results in the previous chapter. If grooms and their families use dowries as a means of extracting 
wealth from the family of the bride, then it seems reasonable that they would need to engage in 
this behavior more when they most need to extract wealth—in times of extreme rainfall. This 
type of strategic use of IPV might call for more severe violence, since it would be more useful as 
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a negotiating tactic. This would explain why rainfall shocks are associated with more severe 
violence, but why they would also correlate with decreased “regular” violence is more difficult 
to explain. 
 
Rainfall and IPV Conclusion: 
Overall, I find mixed evidence of the first link in the causal chain—that rainfall shocks 
might lead to greater IPV. Past literature on this subject has found a consistent relationship 
between the two, so it is reasonable to speculate that these tests were not run on ideal data for 
investigating the impact of shocks on IPV. Regardless, the takeaway from this section is that 
rainfall shocks and IPV aren’t correlated strongly, with the exception of Jordan.   
 
Rainfall and First Cousin Marriage: 
The next step in testing the theory is to examine the link between rainfall shocks and first 
cousin marriage. As mentioned earlier, this step has all of the complications involved in testing 
rainfall and IPV and more. Because marriage is relatively time-invariant and because I need to 
align the timing of the same rainfall shocks, I restrict the sample in these regressions to women 
who first began cohabitating with their partners within the past full year of the interview. 
Another variable I could subset on is rural residence. In the previous section, I kept only 
observations that resided in rural areas because such respondents provided a better way to test 
the theory. Following the same logic should lead me to subset on rural residence again here. 
The problem with subsetting so many times is that is severely diminishes the power of 
these regressions. To counteract this, I combine Egypt and Jordan into one dataset, and present 
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results from regressions using data with and without rural respondents (marriage to a first cousin 
is the DV in each regression): 
 
Figure 14 – Jordan and Egypt Recent First Cousin Marriage Rainfall Shock 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
In both rural and non-rural data, the extreme rainfall dummy is positively and 
significantly correlated with first cousin marriage. The direction and significance reverses with 
the absolute deviation variable. On the one hand, it is encouraging that even with such small 
samples (observations around 700 and 300 with all respondents and rural respondents, 
respectively) extreme rainfall is positively and significantly correlated with first cousin marriage. 
On the other, it is unclear why the extreme rainfall measure was the operationalization of rainfall 
shock that produced the clearest relationship with the dependent variable, since in the regressions 
with IPV as the dependent variable, absolute rainfall deviation produced the clearest results. 
Regressions using only Jordanian data have similar point estimates for the extreme 
rainfall coefficient. Unsurprisingly, their standard errors are much higher, but this is encouraging 
in that more data from Jordan, perhaps from additional DHS’s, might yield better results. 
Overall, then, I interpret these results as mixed evidence for the theory. The extreme 
rainfall operationalization is positively and significantly correlated to subsequent marriage to a 
first cousin for both rural correspondents and all correspondents—a significant point in favor of 
the theory. On the other hand, the absolute rainfall deviation operationalization has no consistent 
relationship—a point against the theory.  
 
India First Cousin and Extreme Rainfall: 
Although I don’t consider this a test of the overarching theory for reasons discussed 
earlier, I replicate the previous regression using the extreme rainfall dummy for rural respondents 
in India. Below are these results: 
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Figure 15 – India First Cousin and Rainfall 
 
Again, extreme rain is positively and significantly correlated with marriage to a first 
cousin. This relationship is slightly perplexing, given that consanguinity is positively correlated 
with IPV in regressions from India’s DHS. Perhaps the most plausible explanation for what is 
happening in India is that negative shocks to rainfall and income increase the need to keep 
wealth in the family, which would in turn increase consanguinity. This is a weak explanation, 
though, because it is inconsistent with the lack of relationship between wealth and consanguinity 
in the above regression. As is the case with Egypt, there are likely interplays between wealth, 
negotiating power for women, and consanguinity and IPV that require further research to 
explore.  
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Using Rainfall Variation to Test Alternative Explanations: 
As a last addendum to this chapter, I use the expectation of rainfall shocks—
operationalized by rainfall standard deviation—to explore the alternative explanation of 
patrilocal exogamy for the findings in Chapter Two. This argument posits that the relationship 
between consanguinity and IPV was a spurious one. The real relationship is that families send 
their daughters away from their homes as a means of insuring against income shocks; this 
distance from her family would increase the likelihood of experiencing IPV and decrease the 
likelihood of consanguinity. An extension of this argument would be that families that expect a 
large degree of rainfall shocks would be more likely to send their daughters away so as to 
provide insurance against large drops in income (Rosenzweig, 1989). This would mean that 
rainfall standard deviation should be negatively correlated with consanguinity, since the 
volatility of rainfall is a reasonable proxy for expectation of negative rainfall shocks. With regard 
to the theory, the volatility of rainfall wouldn’t have any strong theoretical predictions regarding 
Intimate Partner Violence. 
It is not clear that patrilocal exogamy exists to any large extent in either Jordan or Egypt, 
nor that the reason behind it in India is cash transfers back to parents (Fulford, working paper). 
These facts alone suggest to me that the patrilocal exogamy argument is misplaced. Additionally, 
given the impact of climate change on weather patterns all over the world, it is not clear to what 
extent individuals would be able to predict future extreme rainfall. Nonetheless, I repeat tests in 
the prior section with prior standard deviation substituted for rainfall shocks. This includes 
regressions using IPV as the dependent variable, since its relationship to rainfall standard 
deviation is potentially interesting—the patrilocal exogamy argument is agnostic as to the 
 
 
68 
 
relationship between the two, but the presence of a relationship might imply that expectation of 
shocks has an impact on first cousin marriage outside of the patrilocal exogamy argument. 
Other covariates and standard error clustering from the previous section remain the same, 
but are not shown. Here are the rainfall standard deviations and IPV regressions: 
 
Figure 16 – Rainfall Standard Deviation and IPV Jordan 
 
 
Figure 17 – Rainfall Standard Deviation and IPV Egypt 
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The fact that rainfall standard deviation in Egypt is negatively correlated with IPV is 
consistent with the speculative explanation for the negative correlation between rainfall shocks 
and IPV in Egypt. Families with high income variability that are also lower on the income latter 
rely on contributions from women more, thus increasing their bargaining power and decreasing 
the amount of IPV that husbands can get away with.  
Below is a repeat of the regressions with first cousin marriage, again with the 
independent variable of interest substituted and other variable not shown in the regression tables: 
 
Figure 18 – Egypt and Jordan Rainfall Standard Deviation and Cousin Marriage 
 
 
Somewhat supportive of the patrilocal exogamy argument, rainfall standard deviation is 
negatively correlated with marriage to a first cousin, though only at .1 levels. The strength of the 
correlation between rainfall standard deviation and IPV in Egypt and Jordan and the weakness of 
the relationship between rainfall deviation and first cousin marriage together make for weak 
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evidence for the patrilocal exogamy argument—but the evidence for this alternative explanation 
is still about as strong as that for the theory. 
 
Chapter Four Conclusion and Next Steps:  
The empirical results from this chapter are less self-consistent than are those from chapter 
two. Evidence exists for the overall hypotheses regarding the rainfall-IPV and rainfall-
consanguinity links, but it is mostly restricted to Jordan. The sample size of Jordanians who first 
cohabitated in the past two years is so small that deriving satisfactory conclusions regarding first 
cousin marriage is difficult without also including Egyptian respondents. There are many 
potential reasons behind these nonresults, such as: disparate impact of extreme rainfall in 
different countries; small sample size; potential impact of rainfall on consanguinity through 
multiple channels (wealth and IPV could both be impacting consanguinity). Overall, then, I find 
weak evidence for the overarching theory using rainfall tests. 
Below is a table detailing the outcomes just described. The question each cell answers is 
whether there was a positive and significant relationship between the variables of interest (rows) 
and the countries analyzed (columns): 
Figure 19 – Rainfall Shock, IPV, and Consanguinity by Country 
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There are of course many ways to improve upon this analysis. One is to continue with the 
current form and identification strategy and wait for more data to become available. Jordan’s 
2018 DHS is due out soon. Data from this survey could easily be added to those from Jordan’s 
2012, which would at least partially address the potential pitfall of lumping observations from 
two different countries (Egypt and Jordan) together in the same regressions. Though there is no 
guarantee they would include information on consanguinity, or even GIS data, future surveys 
from Egypt, Pakistan, and India could all be combined with the surveys analyzed in this section 
to increase sample size and narrow down effects.  
The above strategy would require years of patience and luck, since the consanguinity 
module would need to be included on any future survey and since it has been implemented 
scarcely in the past. Perhaps a better identification strategy would be to find plausibly exogenous 
variation in IPV or domestic violence enforcement, then examine any concomitant increase in 
first cousin marriage. One example might be the introduction of women’s quotas on party ballot 
lists in Egypt in 2014. Though it is an authoritarian system, one might expect that an increase in 
representation for women might come with more funding for domestic abuse prevention; the test 
would be to then examine consanguineous marriage before and after this quota. Regardless of 
what form it takes, any new tests should focus on exogenous variation in IPV in a way that does 
not also affect consanguinity.  
I conclude this essay in the next two chapters. I first summarize all empirical findings and 
attempt to make a holistic assessment of the theory. I will then briefly discuss practical 
applications of this research, along with the ethical problems of such applications. 
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Chapter Five: Summary of Empirical Evidence and Areas for Improvement 
The overall theory I investigate in this paper is that consanguineous marriage is a strategy 
women can employ to lessen their exposure to Intimate Partner Violence in societies in which 
IPV is common. Strictly correlational tests conducted in chapter two support this theory, with the 
notable exception of India—marriage to a first cousin is consistently and negatively correlated to 
IPV. In light of these results, it is unsurprising that the survey experiment in India described in 
chapter three would yield mostly null results. There is slight evidence, based on their free-form 
verbal responses, that at least some women in this experiment thought about the relationship 
between consanguinity and IPV in ways that are consistent with the theory. Attempts to examine 
a plausible causal chain using rainfall also yielded mostly null results, though the results from 
Jordan in particular conformed to theoretical expectations, even while those in India and Egypt 
for the most part did not.  
 
Figure 20 – Summary of Support for Each Hypothesis 
 
The problem with the attempts at examining the causal chain is that wealth and income 
are inextricably tied up in both IPV and consanguinity. A better approach might be to introduce 
an exogenous decrease in IPV and to observe its impact on first cousin marriage. How that 
exogenous decrease in IPV might happen in a way that does not affect wealth or any other 
potential confounder is beyond me, but perhaps another researcher will devise a scheme to 
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deliver this sort of test. Someone with research money could conceivably run some sort of 
randomized control trial in which men of some areas received anti-IPV training and others did 
not to see the effects on consanguinity. (Given the complicated ethics of this experiment, it might 
be appropriate for a staggered block design).  
Because of the challenging nature of testing these hypotheses, qualitative evidence from 
interviews and surveys might be particularly important. The handful of subjects from the survey 
in India that identified consanguinity as an important factor in IPV suggest that future studies 
might simply interview respondents in India and Jordan about dynamics governing IPV and 
consanguinity in their society. Of course, it would also be beneficial to run a survey experiment 
on marriageable women in these countries to see if they would expect a theoretical 
consanguineous husband to be less abusive than a nonrelated man.  
The overall evidence for the theory is mixed, but there is evidence for it. Future research 
in this area could improve on this work by engaging in some combination of stronger causal 
identification, survey experiments of marriageable women, and qualitative interviews. I conclude 
this paper in the next chapter by discussing policy implication of this research agenda.  
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Chapter Six: Public Policy Implications 
As emphasized in the first chapter of this essay, consanguineous marriage is a 
commonplace practice in many places of the world. Most countries in the Middle East, North 
Africa, and South Asia have rates of consanguineous marriage above 10 percent. Marriage 
between first cousins is not in and of itself a public health or political concern. However, as most 
couples do, women and men married to their first cousins tend to reproduce, and therein lies 
significant public health concerns. Children of consanguineous marriage are at elevated risk of a 
wide array of genetic disorders, and treating these disorders can be expensive. Consider the case 
of four diseases commonly found in children of consanguineous couples: thalassemia, sickle-cell 
anemia, cystic fibrosis and hemophilia. Nonacademic research suggests that Arab countries 
spend billions more dollars on treating these diseases than their raw population numbers should 
suggest; the difference lies in the fact that Arab countries tend to have high rates of 
consanguineous marriage, and therefore consanguineous children (Maher, 2012).   
The prevalence of consanguineous marriages, in conjunction with the concomitant health 
problems children of such marriages can experience, together make for a serious public health 
problem. Understanding why consanguineous coupling continues as a practice is therefore of 
obvious importance to anyone who lives in societies with high rates of consanguineous marriage. 
And indeed policymakers in such societies do take this seriously as a threat to public health. 
National governments in Tunisia and Egypt require consanguineous couples to receive genetic 
counseling before having children, suggesting that officials in countries with high rates of 
consanguineous marriage are fully cognizant of the risks children of consanguineous couples 
face. However, and completely justifiably, they are loathe to discourage consanguineous 
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marriage on medical grounds. A natural question then arises: how can we decrease the rates of 
consanguineous reproduction without entrenching on the rights of consanguineous couples? 
The research presented here could furnish policymakers in Egypt, Tunisia, and any other 
country with high rates of consanguineous marriage with a tool for decreasing future rates of the 
practice. This study provides suggestive evidence that women marry their first cousins in part as 
a means to reduce Intimate Partner Violence by either gathering information about their potential 
husband or enabling punishment for abusive behavior in their marriage. But for this theory to 
hold, two things need to be true: gathering information about potential husbands by dating must 
be difficult, and there must be minimal formal recourse to address domestic abuse by the 
husband. Changing either of these two conditions could potentially do much to remove the 
incentives for consanguineous marriage. 
Changing cultural norms around dating is either impossible or enormously difficult to do 
in a coordinated manner, though of course such norms change on their own (Bajnaid and Elyas, 
2017; Smith-Hefner, 2005). Changing the laws regarding domestic abuse and enforcement 
thereof is much easier.  
Imagine a society like those I have investigated in this essay. Rates of consanguineous 
marriage and Intimate Partner Violence are both high. Let us then imagine for the sake of 
argument that laws guarding against domestic abuse (IPV) are either passed or are actually 
enforced. The passage and enforcement of such laws would remove one of the two conditions 
that must hold for the theory to apply; namely, that women have no recourse to formal 
punishment for abusive husbands. If women on the marriage market believed that they could 
disincentivize their husbands from behaving abusively, then they would have less of a need to a.) 
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gather information regarding potential husbands’ violent tendencies, and b.) to provide 
themselves with a means to censure abusive behavior. In the context of this theory, this means 
that if women were to have recourse to punish IPV, they would have less reason to marry 
consanguineously (or at least marry their first cousins).  
To be clear, I do not believe that promulgating and enforcing stricter anti-domestic abuse 
laws will be a silver bullet solution to high rates of consanguineous marriage. For one thing, 
there are other economic and cultural reasons that people marry consanguineously. For another, 
this research only suggests that the dynamic described above only really applies to women who 
marry their first cousins, not all consanguineous marriages. But perhaps most importantly, the 
shift away from first cousin marriage can only happen once women perceive that their 
communities will provide them with recourse to punish domestic abuse. This perception cannot 
change overnight, and will only do so after a sustained effort on the part of societies with high 
rates of IPV. Nonetheless, it requires only a slight jump from the evidence presented in this essay 
to suspect that enforcing anti-domestic abuse laws could go a long way towards changing rates 
of consanguineous marriage (particularly first-cousin marriage).  
Ethics: 
It seems to me that there are two primary ethical issues entwined in the policy 
recommendations outlined above. The first is that these recommendations can appear at first pass 
to condemn consanguineous marriage as a practice. The second is that it also places a high 
premium on censuring Intimate Partner Violence, perhaps at the cost of ignoring or superseding 
local cultural values.  
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This first point is especially crucial because the history of western-style public health and 
medicine interacting with consanguineous couples is fraught poor cross-cultural 
misunderstanding. For years, clinical genetic consultants in the United States routinely 
exaggerated the risks of passing on genetic conditions to their children, causing undue harm and 
stress to consanguineous couples (Bennett et al., 2009). Clinical counselors eventually had to 
learn to balance the real risks that do exist for consanguineous couples with respect for the 
couples themselves. This phenomenon mirrors the larger problem of paternalism in public health 
(Nys, 2008; Anker, 2016). 
Any practical adaption of this research should learn from the experience of both 
counselors dealing with consanguineous couples and implementation of public health programs 
more broadly, because paternalistically judging consanguineous couples for their choices is both 
inconsiderate and counterproductive. Fortunately, there is a rich literature that addresses ethical 
and cultural concerns of changing cultural practices regarding marriage (see, among others: 
Mackie, 1996; Mackie, 2003; Creanza et al., 2017, etc.). Likewise, considered efforts have been 
made to address concerns of paternalism when implementing public health research (for 
example, Wilson, 2009).  
I am very much sympathetic to the argument that applying this research with the goal of 
decreasing both consanguinity and IPV ignores the cultural value of consanguineous marriage. I 
am less sympathetic to the same argument applied to Intimate Partner Violence. Of course, 
examples abound of well-intentioned reforms backfiring in unforeseen ways (Margetts et al., 
2012). But it is valid as a value system to place improving physical safety of women over 
respecting cultural traditions. One could argue that this is an application of the harm principle, 
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since IPV very much harms women (Wilson, 2011; Mill, 1860). It is beyond the scope of both 
this paper and my own expertise to provide a formal defense of this position, but the situation is 
similar to Gerry Mackie’s research regarding female genital mutilation insofar as both are 
concerned with changing a cultural tradition that has deleterious overall effects even while 
providing benefits to some individuals. Scholars interested in the ethical implications of any 
attempt to practically apply this research should examine that research program as well.  
Ultimately, it is likely best from an ethical perspective (not to mention practical) to 
supply this information to local NGO’s and governments to allow them to evaluate the values 
tradeoffs mentioned above on their own. While this does not entirely remove the possibility of 
paternalism, it does respect local cultural autonomy to the greatest extent possible.  
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Appendix A 
Alternative Specifications to models presented in Chapter Two: 
With data source and dependent variable: 
 
Figure 21 – Pakistan Alternative Specifications Less Severe 
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Figure 22 – Pakistan Alternative  Specifications More Severe 
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Figure 23 – Egypt Alternative Specifications Less Severe 
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Figure 24 – Egypt Alternative Specification More Severe 
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Figure 25 – Jordan Alternative Specification Less Severe 
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Figure 26 – Jordan Alternative Specification More Severe 
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Figure 27 – Pakistan Language Specification Less Severe 
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Figure 28 – Pakistan Base Specification 
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Figure 29 – Pakistan Language Specification More Severe 
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Appendix B 
Code and output from using R’s structural topic modelling on free response questions from the 
Indian survey (for survey respondents who received a description of the man as ‘related’): 
 
processed<-textProcessor(datanewformat$elaboration, metadata=datanewformat) 
out<-prepDocuments(processed$documents, processed$vocab, processed$meta) 
docs<-out$documents 
vocab<-out$vocab 
meta<-out$meta 
 
 
out1 <- prepDocuments(processed$documents, processed$vocab, processed$meta, lower.thresh 
= 15) 
 
poliblogPrevFit <- stm(documents = out1$documents, vocab = out1$vocab, K = 10, prevalence 
=~ consanguinity +  education+husbandeducation+income+childhoodviolence, 
max.em.its = 75, data = out$meta, init.type = "Spectral") 
 
 
summary(poliblogPrevFit) 
Topic 1 Top Words: 
   Highest Prob: give, violenc, may, tortur, advic, will, alcohol  
   FREX: violenc, give, advic, tortur, may, alcohol, will  
   Lift: advic, violenc, give, tortur, may, alcohol, take  
   Score: advic, give, violenc, may, tortur, alcohol, will  
Topic 2 Top Words: 
   Highest Prob: well, may, wife, parent, son, alway, support  
   FREX: well, may, wife, parent, alway, son, support  
   Lift: well, may, wife, alway, parent, son, support  
   Score: well, may, wife, alway, parent, support, believ  
Topic 3 Top Words: 
   Highest Prob: habit, alcohol, can, bad, futur, parent, son  
   FREX: habit, bad, can, alcohol, futur, parent, never  
   Lift: bad, futur, habit, can, alcohol, parent, never  
   Score: bad, habit, alcohol, can, futur, parent, never  
Topic 4 Top Words: 
   Highest Prob: good, famili, will, also, know, member, disturb  
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   FREX: famili, good, member, know, also, disturb, will  
   Lift: member, famili, disturb, know, good, also, will  
   Score: member, famili, good, disturb, know, also, will  
Topic 5 Top Words: 
   Highest Prob: use, wife, quarrel, take, drink, fight, peopl  
   FREX: use, quarrel, peopl, work, fight, wife, drink  
   Lift: work, peopl, use, quarrel, fight, scold, drink  
   Score: work, use, quarrel, peopl, fight, wife, drink  
Topic 6 Top Words: 
   Highest Prob: son, support, think, believ, attitud, never, parent  
   FREX: son, think, support, attitud, believ, never, parent  
   Lift: think, attitud, son, believ, support, never, parent  
   Score: think, support, believ, son, attitud, never, parent  
Topic 7 Top Words: 
   Highest Prob: daughter--law, friend, support, chang, son, fight, will  
   FREX: friend, daughter--law, chang, support, son, fight, take  
   Lift: friend, chang, daughter--law, support, son, fight, take  
   Score: friend, chang, daughter--law, support, son, fight, take  
Topic 8 Top Words: 
   Highest Prob: look, will, believ, wife, take, parent, alcohol  
   FREX: look, believ, take, will, wife, drink, alcohol  
   Lift: look, believ, drink, take, wife, will, alcohol  
   Score: look, believ, wife, drink, will, alcohol, take  
Topic 9 Top Words: 
   Highest Prob: will, relat, marri, -law, tortur, never, parent  
   FREX: marri, relat, -law, will, tortur, never, also  
   Lift: marri, -law, relat, never, will, tortur, scold  
   Score: marri, relat, -law, will, tortur, never, give  
Topic 10 Top Words: 
   Highest Prob: parent, will, son, support, behaviour, alway, take  
   FREX: parent, behaviour, son, alway, will, support, take  
   Lift: behaviour, alway, parent, support, son, will, take  
   Score: behaviour, parent, support, alway, son, will, take  
 
 
 
 
Topics 2, 4, 6, 7, and 10 (highlighted) all address at least in part the notion that the woman’s 
relationship with her in-laws might be relevant, with topic ten seeming to be the most so. I find 
this reassuring since it implies that this dynamic is important, even if it doesn’t precisely follow 
the patterns I theorize. But I am hesitant to use these topics in any statistical model because I am 
not confident I can delineate between the ones that assume parental support of the son and those 
that assume parental support of the daughter-in-law (i.e., niece). As mentioned above, I think 
compositional or semantic analysis is a good route to follow here.  
With that said, below is output from the estimateEffect() function for the relevant estimated 
topics. There are really no consistent results to speak of here, which possibly reflects semantic 
incoherence between the different topics. The two variables of interest are consanguinity, which 
describes whether the respondent was in a consanguineous marriage herself, and 
experimentconsang, which denotes that the respondent received the description of a man who 
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was related to the hypothetical woman in the survey. We would expect both to be positively 
correlated with the topic dependent, but neither is consistently positively correlated. In fact, 
topics 7 and 10 are significantly negatively correlated with consanguineous marriage.  
 
 
Call: 
estimateEffect(formula = 1:10 ~ consanguinity + education + husbandeducation 
+  
    income + childhoodviolence + experimentconsang, stmobj = poliblogPrevFit,  
    metadata = out1$meta, uncertainty = "Global") 
 
 
Topic 2: 
 
Coefficients: 
                   Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)        0.173044   0.025549   6.773 6.79e-11 *** 
consanguinity1     0.023676   0.013199   1.794  0.07387 .   
education         -0.009604   0.008056  -1.192  0.23415     
husbandeducation   0.006763   0.007238   0.934  0.35084     
income            -0.028396   0.005600  -5.070 7.01e-07 *** 
childhoodviolence -0.036937   0.013863  -2.664  0.00814 **  
experimentconsang -0.007596   0.014462  -0.525  0.59983     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
 
Topic 4: 
 
Coefficients: 
                   Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
(Intercept)        0.064981   0.023943   2.714  0.00704 ** 
consanguinity1    -0.009982   0.012030  -0.830  0.40734    
education          0.002474   0.007871   0.314  0.75352    
husbandeducation  -0.004112   0.006097  -0.675  0.50051    
income             0.011769   0.005337   2.205  0.02821 *  
childhoodviolence -0.012386   0.013108  -0.945  0.34547    
experimentconsang -0.003481   0.011984  -0.290  0.77167    
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Topic 6: 
 
Coefficients: 
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)        0.0422598  0.0225526   1.874  0.06194 .   
consanguinity1     0.0167139  0.0123352   1.355  0.17646     
education          0.0298337  0.0072209   4.132 4.69e-05 *** 
husbandeducation  -0.0038456  0.0056312  -0.683  0.49520     
income            -0.0141018  0.0048303  -2.919  0.00378 **  
childhoodviolence  0.0005129  0.0121407   0.042  0.96633     
experimentconsang  0.0257631  0.0114916   2.242  0.02571 *   
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--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
 
Topic 7: 
 
Coefficients: 
                    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)        3.317e-02  1.431e-02   2.318   0.0212 *   
consanguinity1    -2.497e-02  6.249e-03  -3.996 8.15e-05 *** 
education          2.929e-03  4.298e-03   0.681   0.4961     
husbandeducation   1.151e-03  3.496e-03   0.329   0.7422     
income             5.966e-03  2.739e-03   2.178   0.0302 *   
childhoodviolence -7.589e-05  7.058e-03  -0.011   0.9914     
experimentconsang -5.485e-03  6.599e-03  -0.831   0.4065     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
Topic 10: 
 
Coefficients: 
                   Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)        0.098191   0.024081   4.077 5.86e-05 *** 
consanguinity1    -0.058915   0.013522  -4.357 1.82e-05 *** 
education         -0.003386   0.008259  -0.410  0.68213     
husbandeducation   0.011750   0.006650   1.767  0.07827 .   
income             0.015734   0.005353   2.939  0.00355 **  
childhoodviolence -0.016757   0.012925  -1.296  0.19582     
experimentconsang -0.011420   0.013012  -0.878  0.38084     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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Appendix C 
Diagnostic Tests for Specified Regressions: 
In the below tables, I give Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit tests and ROC curves for the 
logistic regression models presented in the main text. 
Figure 30 – Pakistan Less Severe Diagnostics 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test (binary model) 
X-squared = 9.9354, df = 8, p-value = 0.2696 
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Graph 4 – Pakistan Less Violent ROC Curve 
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Figure 31 – Pakistan More Severe Diagnostics 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test (binary model) 
 
X-squared = 6.9378, df = 8, p-value = 0.5434 
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Graph 5 – Pakistan More Violent ROC Curve 
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Figure 32  - Egypt More Severe Diagnostics 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test (binary model) 
X-squared = 13.498, df = 8, p-value = 0.09582 
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Graph 6 – Egypt Severe Violence ROC Curve 
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Figure 33 – Egypt Less Severe Diagnostics 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test (binary model) 
X-squared = 20.369, df = 8, p-value = 0.009027 
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Graph 7 - Egypt Less Severe Violence ROC Curve 
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Figure 34 – Jordan Severe Diagnostics 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test (binary model) 
X-squared = 9.7974, df = 8, p-value = 0.2795 
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Graph 8 – Jordan Severe Violence ROC Curve 
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Figure 35 – Jordan More Severe Diagnostics 
 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test (binary model) 
 
X-squared = 16.202, df = 8, p-value = 0.03958 
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Graph 9  – Jordan Less Severe Violence ROC Curve 
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Appendix D 
R code and output for mediation test for Egypt’s DHS: 
 
model.m<-
glm(husbanddrinks~firstcousin+secondcousin+otherrelative+husbanded+wifeeducation 
             +Wealth+Childrenborn+Childrenathome 
             +v705husbandemployed+v714wifeemployed+v130Christian,  
             family=binomial(link='logit'),data=Egyptsub1, 
             na.action=na.exclude) 
model.y<-glm(severeviolhus~firstcousin+secondcousin+otherrelative+husbanded+wifeeducation 
             +husbanddrinks+Wealth+Childrenborn+Childrenathome 
             +v705husbandemployed+v714wifeemployed+v130Christian,  
             family=binomial(link='logit'),data=EgyptIR, 
             na.action=na.exclude) 
 
firstmediate<-mediate(model.m, model.y, treat="firstcousin", mediator="husbanddrinks", 
sims=5000) 
summary(firstmediate) 
 
 
Causal Mediation Analysis  
 
Quasi-Bayesian Confidence Intervals 
 
                          Estimate 95% CI Lower 95% CI Upper p-value 
ACME (control)           -0.002425    -0.004622    -0.000258    0.04 
ACME (treated)           -0.001895    -0.003842    -0.000202    0.04 
ADE (control)            -0.026112    -0.047305    -0.007007    0.01 
ADE (treated)            -0.025582    -0.046328    -0.006883    0.01 
Total Effect             -0.028007    -0.049078    -0.009067    0.01 
Prop. Mediated (control)  0.086068     0.006611     0.272370    0.04 
Prop. Mediated (treated)  0.065507     0.004233     0.248879    0.04 
ACME (average)           -0.002160    -0.004178    -0.000226    0.04 
ADE (average)            -0.025847    -0.046885    -0.006945    0.01 
Prop. Mediated (average)  0.075787     0.005576     0.261027    0.04 
 
Sample Size Used: 6635  
Simulations: 5000  
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Appendix E 
 
Having a Say in Choosing your Husband: 
Pakistan’s 2012-13 DHS also is the only survey in the DHS archive to contain a question 
that asks respondents whether they had any say in choosing their husband. Responses are 
recorded as a binary yes/no. 
The inclusion of this question presents a unique opportunity to test the theory that women 
turn to consanguineous marriage in the face of high rates of Intimate Partner Violence. One 
testable hypothesis that could be derived from this theory is that women who have a say in who 
they marry should marry first cousins more frequently than their counterparts who do not have a 
choice.  
This hypothesis is at least somewhat at odds with the prior assertion that the theory could 
still apply to women who have no say in whom they choose to marry, since their families could 
also have a preference to avoid marrying their daughter to an abusive man. Despite this apparent 
tension, both can be true. A family can prefer its daughter marry a nonabusive man, but its 
preference for nonabuse might be weaker than the woman’s preference, since the family does not 
directly suffer the consequences of abuse.  
Regardless, the presence of this question on the survey offers at the very least an 
interesting opportunity to explore subtleties in how Intimate Partner Violence might be linked to 
marriage to a first cousin and consanguineous marriage in general. In these regressions, I use the 
ability of a woman to have a say in choosing her husband as an independent variable and 
marriage to different levels of relatives as the dependent variables. So for instance, in the first 
regression I treat marriage to a first cousin as a binary 0/1 dependent variable (with a 1 indicating 
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marriage to a first cousin). Subsequent regressions do the same but substitute marriage to a 
second cousin and “other relative” into the dependent variable.  
Figure 36 – Pakistan Having a Say in Choosing Husband 
 
As you can see, having a say in choosing your husband is positively correlated with 
marriage to a first cousin, at a .01 significance level. I interpret this as strong evidence in support 
of the theory. If either mechanism I propose is at least partially correct, then I would expect that 
having a say in choosing your husband should lead to more marriages to first cousins. And 
indeed it does. 
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We might also suspect that the negative relationship between consanguinity and IPV is 
stronger for women who do have a say in choosing their husband. In theory, women seek to 
avoid violent partners on the marriage market and to arm themselves with means of constraining 
such violence. It therefore seems reasonable that when given the choice, women would opt for 
husbands who offer them stronger guarantees against IPV. 
To test this intuition, I recreated the regressions with different levels of Intimate Partner 
Violence as the dependent variables, but using only respondents who had a say in choosing their 
husbands. The coefficients of marriage to a first cousin are practically identical, but with larger 
standard errors due to fewer observations in the regression overall. There is therefore not enough 
evidence to suggest that the relationship between consanguinity and IPV is different for women 
who had a say in choosing their husband: 
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Figure 37 – Pakistan Tests for Respondents who Had a Say in Choosing Husband 
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